Hong Kong, 2020 - written on May 35

In memory of June 4, it is befitting to reflect on what has happened in Hong Kong over the past few months. 

31 years after the fateful night entering Tiananmen Square, the annual vigil commemorating the event was for the first time banned on Chinese soil. There will be no bloodshed at same scale in our beloved city, as times have changed and leaders of the north have found more subtle yet aggressive ways to achieve the same results. 

June 4 marked the end of social distancing measures announced earlier in May. The measures were put in place citing covid situation (public health) as main reasons. But this is dubious, and the very date of the measures suggested political motivation. Despite banning the official vigil at Victoria Park, on June 4 the police was exercising restraint to attendees. In other areas there was some use of pepper spray to disperse crowds.. 

It is a somewhat solemn way to live the day, an anticlimax as Hong Kong has entered gradually into a looming sense of helplessness, powerlessness, and gradual asphyxiation.

Even before the National Security Law saga, multiple events have been building up to eat away free speech. 

• The history exam question saga caused a snowstorm when one question in the public history exam asked if the student would “agree that Japan brought more good than harm to China in the period between 1900 and 1945?” Criticized by China, the Education Secretary had to retract the question (or render it unmarked hence useless), citing that this might hurt Chinese citizens' feelings. A history student would normally be expected to apply critical methods to examine such a question. But in the current atmosphere, political correctness does not tolerate critical thinking, and certain “truths” must be defended to the end and must not be discussed.
• Headliner, a political satire show, which incidentally also began in 1989, was asked to be stopped after airing its final episodes of the season. It aired an episode toward the police, which is part of the establishment to quell protests. In 2020, the cessation of the show indicates a clear direction Hong Kong is headed. Let alone issues relating to national security, even satire toward anyone close to the establishment will not be tolerated. That the show, one run by RTHK, a public media organization funded by the government, has been able to stay afloat for so long is itself somewhat a miracle.
• National Anthem Bill was passed on June 4, in response to Hong Kongers who boo the national anthem during football matches. The bill speaks for itself.

Some public intellectuals have called the period Cultural Revolution 2.0, referencing the activities of denouncing actions, literary works, or people due to political correctness and truth suited to political demands.

In 2020, the reality of political need is to close down areas permitted for free speech, to render Hong Kong closer to other mainland cities in this regard, all the while keeping the city’s special status for all the economic benefits the city brings.

Such is the prelude for National Security Law on Hong Kong in late May. The concerns from the international community is well documented in major press around the world. It is controversial because 

• It effectively circumvents the Hong Kong mini-constitution Basic Law and enables enactment of suspected sedition activities in Hong Kong
• Another element of surprise is the possibility of setting up an agency in Hong Kong to enforce the legislation - turning the region into one country one system. Given legal standards of the north, anything that slightly blemishes the establishment (including criticizing public policy and defending civic rights), can be interpreted as a national security threat.

But this begs one question: why now and what is the end game? From the CCP general operation logic, most, if not all, steps are calculated meticulously before any action.

The current legislation is a calculated bet that however Hong Kongers react, they are ready a few steps ahead in the chess game.

Scenario 1: business as usual with gradual decrease of freedom of speech

This is a scenario with higher probability of occurrence.

As explained in a supporting document for the law, because of the political situation developed in Hong Kong since the handover (i.e. Hong Kongers’ growing political resistance especially after 2003), passing national security related legislation within the HK legislative apparatus is difficult, and hence National Congress had to circumvent it. 

One calculated result is that Hong Kong Legislative Council is being viewed as becoming powerless - rendering upcoming September elections irrelevant.  Legislation of national security has always been a rallying cry for supporting pro-democracy camp, calling on Hong Kongers to keep the minimum one third of seats that can block this legislation. As this rationale is no longer valid, voters will feel gutted about voting and the Legislative Council risks becoming a rubber stamp function.

Prevention of foreign interference is another cited reason for legislation. As expected, western countries (in particular Anglophone ones) who have immediately issued a joint declaration. UK stated they would provide a path to citizenship to BNO holders, if China really enforces the law. The US considers revoking Hong Kong’s special trade status, though lumping his speech with a range of other issues related to China.

Foreign countries’ reactions proved realization of the next calculated risk - commercial interests and trade are valued higher than other issues among the international community. In post-covid world where the world still requires Chinese supply chain as part of economic recovery, no one will really unilaterally act on defending Hong Kong freedom at the cost of trading relations with China. Hong Kong therefore is more of a bargaining chip.

Early June investors “viewed” foriegn reaction as favorable, which was reflected in a stock market rise. Source of capital injection in HK is highly influenced by northern money, which could have helped coordinate to create this scene.

Another unspoken aim of China is on its internal economic situation, which is not looking so good post-covid times. Social unrest has higher chances of manifesting when people are suffering from economic hardship. National security issues are often used as a movement and ideology to unite people, divert their attention and give them a common topic to talk about.

All this coupled with post-Covid fatigue, protest movements’ lack of funding as long as the police does not intensify their violence hard on, Beijing reasons it is smooth sailing until after September elections. Unless it sees itself being provoked, Beijing will leave the legislation as a backend threat, weaponized only when necessary.

Scenario 2: fierce resistance, create chaos to create a lose-lose situation

This is a less likely scenario.

People outside of Hong Kong do not know 攬炒 is a particularly Hong Kong word used in the movement, meaning defend Hong Kong at any cost. This could mean intensifying public disruption, wreaking havoc, and if the end result is Hong Kong special status, it is a case of mutual destruction as it also hurts China interests in HK (detailed in my piece last year on Hong Kong).

June 4 already saw people defying police restriction orders heading into the vigil. Once covid dies down and Hong Kong reopens for business, which will likely happen more toward July, there are signs that protests might pick up. Already in May street protests were seen. July 1 - day of handover might see more of this action.

The legislation of National Security Law can be read as precisely to deal with this scenario. The Hong Kong protesters have prided themselves as having no backstage, act like water, meaning they are highly adaptable and no single organization with particular ideology or interests can influence and control their actions.

What this means is protesters in reality represent a group of people with different ideologies. Among them there are believers of Hong Kong independence which China finds very menacing.

In case more hardline protesters are activated, backed now by the legislation, an agency can immediately be established in Hong Kong and arrest them en masse. Again this fully falls within Beijing expectations.

What’s Next? Things are not all looking down

Thinking of a metaphor for this, I was inclined to use the boiling frog metaphor. But what’s more fitting is the ice drip torture method (I forgot where this was applied). The tortured person is blinded, and the torturer slices the person’s arm with ice, leading the tortured to believe he/she was cut. Torturer then places a bucket of water with a hole, and the tortured could hear water dripping slowly, thinking it is blood. No harm was actually done, but slowly the tortured will die purely due to mental pressures, thinking that the drips are from his/her own blood.

At the time of writing, the establishment is on the upside, and helplessness is widely felt.

Other than keeping hope alive, there are a few things within control of Hong Kongers.

1. At least for the time being, different factions in China cannot afford to lose Hong Kong’s special status. Just look at Huawei’s boss lady’s business dealings and passports held and one would know the value Hong Kong plays. Such status is built over time, and foreign recognition remains to be one main pillar to sustain it. On top of it, the wealth of many factions are built in Hong Kong. For the foreseeable future, the city will continue to be a pawn, offering space to maneuver. National Security law will not be immediately and harshly implemented as Hong Kong is still not (yet) another city in Mainland.
2. You can’t fully quell a movement unless you kill all the people. People supporting the democratic cause are still well over 50% of the voting population, and on top of that sympathizing swing voters. Ideas cannot be killed. Unless people leave in exodus, they will continue to tell the story and defend the core values of Hong Kong. 
3. Civil society has grown exponentially over time. People are finding practical ways to help each other. How Hong Kong beat the coronavirus pandemic was one such example, in which people have found a way to reduce reliance on the government. And due to the proximity of China, people can see through a lot of things our foriegn friends cannot see. This is value in itself.
4. Another classic example is “yellow economic circle,” in which people continue to visit stores and shops who have been supporting local movement, and help to largely avoid external influence or supporting the opposite camp. On this, to continue sustaining the efforts, one has to stop over zealous debates on who is “truly” yellow. After all in a globalized and increasingly interrelated economy, it is extremely difficult to separate whether any part of a business’ sourcing/costs come from a particular party. It is the overall stance that matters.
5. Legislative Council elections in September is not a complete lost cause. If there is enough momentum in the upcoming elections for the yellow camp, targeting over 35 seats maintaining majority, it will still form a major obstacle for the Hong Kong government to do any legislative work. Beyond national security, there are still many meaningful legislation that can be pondered, and limit corroboration between tycoons and government officials. More importantly, a win in LegCo elections will be a strong shot of confidence to the city’s psych, generating momentum that continues the movement in its fluid water form.
6. Contrary to popular belief, mainlanders, in particular the economic elite, are actually aware of June 4 events, and know the reason behind protests in Hong Kong. Certainly they will not openly support the cause given the current political realities. It is also true that with the successful implementation of the information firewall, many Mainlanders will still not sympathize with Hong Kongers because of division of value. However, this is not a lost cause, by reason and discussions over time, opinions do change. This will require patience. Views are formed largely by one’s social and political environment and will not change overnight. China may hold tight security control backed by heavy surveillance, but there is unrest at local levels and things are not fully stable.
7. Despite a benefit to still trade with China, worldwide feelings of Mainland China has subtly begun to take a negative turn. Looking at a longer horizon, companies from China, whether private or state  owned, may not be viewed so favorably, and countries will try to diversify their supply chain and increase investment locally or into alternative options to reduce reliance on Chinese money. The same players will be Hong Kong sympathizers. This might not do much in the short term, but in the longer run it might help bring momentum and influence on the cause.